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1 Stimulating the Attractiveness of PFI/PPP 
2 Projects through Public Sector Guarantees.
3 Abstract
4 Purpose
5 Although the UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures (UKGSI) was introduced in 2012 to 
6 address the huge financing gap for critical infrastructures, PFI sponsors have so far guaranteed 
7 only few projects. Many stakeholders in the project finance industry have blamed this situation 
8 on lack of general understanding of strategies for harnessing the benefits of government 
9 guarantees. The study therefore investigates the perspectives of PFI/PPP stakeholders in the 
10 UK on critical factors influencing approval for government guarantee using the UK guarantee 
11 scheme for Infrastructure as a focal point.
12 Design/methodology/approach
13 Using a mixed methodology approach, the study identified 26 important criteria used in 
14 evaluating government guarantee applications through focus group discussions with PFI 
15 stakeholders. These criteria were put in questionnaire survey to 195 respondents.
16 Findings
17 Through factor analysis, five (5) critical factors determining successful government guarantee 
18 application were unravelled. These include (1) compliance with UK National Infrastructure 
19 Plan, (2) demonstration of project bankability and risk management, (3) value for money (4) 
20 proof of dependence on the guarantee and (5) certainty of planning commission's approval.
21 Originality/value 
22  Results will facilitate in-depth understanding of critical factors for accessing government 
23 guarantees, while also improving the bankability of prospective PFI projects.
24
25 Keywords:  UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures (UKGSI), Private Finance Initiatives 
26 (PFI), Public Private Partnership (PPP), Public Sector, Stakeholders. 
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27 1.0 Background
28 The last global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007/08 raised serious debates about risk management 
29 in the banking sector (Demirag et al., 2015). Leading up to the market crash, bank funding was 
30 very much accessible with significant competition for PFI/PPP projects by offering attractive 
31 loan pricing and structures to sponsors (Mills, 2010). However, by the beginning of 2008, the 
32 sheer enormity of financial loss suffered by project financiers, especially mono-line credit 
33 insurers at the wake of crisis, led many banks out of the PFI/PPP market (Haran et al., 2013). 
34 According to the 2013 report of European PPP Expertise Centre, the European PPP market had 
35 plunged to its lowest level towards the end of 2012, with deals reaching financial close as low 
36 as €11.7billion. This reduced global activity for PPP, particularly bond and senior debt finance 
37 created huge uncertainty that threatened long-term finance for many public sector 
38 infrastructures (Hampl et al, 2011). Therefore, the need for government interventions became 
39 urgent and necessary amidst growing infrastructure demands (Toms et al., 2011, Connolly and 
40 Wall, 2011).
41
42 Realising the need to encourage more private sector investments in new United Kingdom’s 
43 (U.K) public infrastructures (valued at £250billion in the NIP Policy, 2011), the HM Treasury 
44 introduced an infrastructure stimulus package known as UK Guarantee Scheme for 
45 Infrastructures (UKGSI) in July 2012 (Wynne, 2015). The primary aim of the scheme was to 
46 avoid delays to private investments in viable UK infrastructures, which may have been 
47 hindered by the adverse credit situation in the financial market (HM Treasury, 2014). As part 
48 of its mandate, the scheme was to provide a sovereign-backed guarantee that makes high-risk 
49 infrastructural projects within the UK bankable to lenders, while also stimulating growth within 
50 the financial market (Wynne, 2015). However, despite the laudable objectives behind the 
51 UKGSI, a recent report from the National Audit Office (NAO, 2015) revealed that many 
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52 project sponsors have only been able to secure guarantee for few infrastructure projects. 
53 According to National Audit Office (2015 .p5), out of the 200 applications for government 
54 guarantee scheme received by the Treasury Department, only 7 projects have been approved 
55 while 39 other projects were pre-qualified.
56
57 From the perspectives of the HM Treasury (2013), notable among the factors militating against 
58 project sponsors’ access to this fiscal facility is poor structuring of potential guarantee 
59 applications for projects. Wynne (2015) argued that many project sponsors seeking government 
60 guarantee often fail to prove commercial viability of their business cases. According to HM 
61 Treasury (2014), extensive due diligence appraisals are conducted on guarantee applications, 
62 in a similar way to that carried out by project finance banks. As a result, project sponsors are 
63 expected to present guarantee applications with strong potentials that can withstand 
64 government set criteria and a test of viability (Wynne, 2015). However, while the existence of 
65 government guarantee would understandably encourage project lenders towards financing PFI 
66 projects, the unstable PFI market makes raising senior debt a challenge for sponsors (Connolly 
67 and Wall, 2011; Johal et al., 2012). As such, many project lenders (banks) have avoided long-
68 term lending (Crotty, 2009; Johal et al., 2012; Demirag et al., 2015), while the available loan 
69 deals are concentrated in few large projects (refer to Fig.1 below). Based on the foregoing facts, 
70 the UK government still foresees shortage in market efficiency, coupled with sustained high 
71 procurement costs (NAO, 2015; Demirag et al., 2015).  
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73 Fig. 1. Volume of bank lending and bonds to UK PFI projects (£bn.) between 2006 -2014
74 Adapted From National Audit Office (2015)
75
76 Currently, the newly revised National I frastructure Plan (NIP, 2014) has revalued UK’s 
77 infrastructure needs as £466billion (HM Treasury, 2014). Two-thirds of these infrastructures 
78 are proposed to be funded via Private sector routes such as the PFI/PPP (NAO, 2015). 
79 Therefore, the big question that PPP stakeholders have continued to ask is what reliable 
80 strategies can be use by project sponsors in order to ensure successful government guarantee 
81 approval. The focus of this paper is to investigate PFI/PPP stakeholders’ perspectives towards 
82 identifying the critical factors influencing successful government guarantee applications under 
83 the UKGSI. 
84 In other to achieve the above aim, this study identified the following objectives:
85 1. To identify a robust and reliable set of criteria relevant for evaluating UK government 
86 guarantee for PFI/PPP infrastructure project during guarantee appraisal.
87 2. To explore the underlying critical factors necessary for PFI/PPP project sponsors to win 
88 guarantee scheme approval for infrastructure projects under the UKGSI.
The graph reveals that banks lend to fewer PFI projects with value above £500m, compared to 
PFI projects of value below £500m over the 9-year period
£bn.
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89 This study contributes to existing body of literatures on PFI/PPP procurement, by focusing on 
90 mechanisms driving government guarantee approval. The following section begins by 
91 examining the Post-GFC PFI/PPP market as well as the emergence of UK Guarantee Scheme 
92 for Infrastructure policy. This is then followed by the research methodology section (mixed 
93 methodology), involving focus group discussions and postal questionnaire survey to PFI/PPP 
94 stakeholders in the UK for data collection. The next section presents analysis of qualitative and 
95 quantitative data from focus groups and questionnaire survey respectively. The final section 
96 discusses findings from the survey, which were corroborated with perspectives from 
97 stakeholders’ elicited during focus groups interviews. However, while the study centres on 
98 UK’s government guarantees, future studies can take results of this research and confirm its 
99 wider applicability in other countries and regions.
100
101 2.0 Post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in UK PFI/PPP Market and Emergence of 
102 UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures
103
104 In spite of the importance of PFI/PPP for financing public-oriented projects such as roads, rail 
105 network, hospitals etc. (Yang et al., 2013), the last global financial crisis created drastic 
106 reduction in loan available for numerous project finance contracts (Meng and McKevitt, 2011; 
107 Hampl et al; 2011; Demirag et al; 2011; Farrell, 2003). The world project finance market which 
108 attained a record high $68.6 billion in 2008 suddenly plummeted by the end of 2009 to about 
109 $55.5 billion due to the effect of the economic meltdown (Demirag et al, 2011). By the 
110 beginning of 2010, the value of bank lending to UK infrastructural projects had fallen from 
111 £6billion pre-crisis level to £3billion (NAO, 2015). A big gap between customer deposits and 
112 bank loans resulted (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012), as government’s access to risk free 
113 borrowing drastically reduced (Toms et al., 2011). In addition, the new wave of financial 
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114 regulations and structural revisions that followed, as an aftermath of the credit crunch, led to 
115 massive exodus of lenders from the PFI market (Demirag et al., 2015). 
116
117 Amidst rising pressures on current infrastructures and budgetary constraints ((Hodge and 
118 Greve, 2007; Demirag et al., 2015), the reality on ground presented governments with 
119 enormous challenges in mobilising long-term finance for new infrastructures (HM Treasury, 
120 2014). Due to this negative impact, reversing the dangerous trend and ensuring access to 
121 finance for critical infrastructures became a global agenda. This saw a number of developed 
122 economies such as the UK, US, Japan, Australia, China etc. massively roll out various 
123 economic and fiscal stimulus packages (Drew, 2010). The Obama administration rolled out the 
124 most massive bailout, injecting about $US800 billion in fiscal stimulus package, into the US 
125 financial system (Garrett, 2010).
126
127 Following this trend, the UK Government in 2012, passed into law the Financial Assistance 
128 Act. This act empowered the Treasury Department to provide financial guarantees for critical 
129 infrastructure in the UK (NAO, 2015) and resulted in the introduction of a 4year UK Guarantee 
130 Scheme for Infrastructures (UKGSI). The UKGSI was conceived to provide an unconditional 
131 government cover for risks as well as other liabilities associated with financing large-scale 
132 infrastructures in UK. This HM Treasury’s policy was backed by a £40billion cover, which 
133 was made accessible to potential investors (project sponsors) in UK infrastructures. The 
134 scheme was to facilitate successful implementation of the 2011 National Infrastructure Plan 
135 (NIP). The NIP, which is a 5-year infrastructure master plan, is coordinated by Infrastructure 
136 UK (IUK), a department in the HM Treasury. The NIP highlighted priority sectors for new 
137 infrastructural investments within the UK economy. Additionally, the policy had earlier 
138 documented about 500 new infrastructure projects within the UK, requiring investments to the 
Page 6 of 36World Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
W
orld Journal of Entrepreneurship, M
anagem
ent and Sustainable Developm
ent
7
139 tune of £250billion, with two-thirds of such investments to be privately financed using schemes 
140 such as the PFI/PPP. See Fig.2 below for conceptual framework of the scheme and the focus 
141 of the study:
142
143
144 Fig.2. Conceptual Framework for UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures 
145 Adapted from NAO, (2015).
146
147 However, since the scheme’s emergence, many project sponsors in UK infrastructures have 
148 had difficulty accessing the guarantee (Wynne, 2015). While the NAO (2015) highlighted poor 
149 structuring of projects’ business case as the major barrier preventing sponsors’ access to the 
150 scheme, some sections among industry stakeholders highlighted poor understanding of the 
151 guarantee scheme (Atmo and Duffield, 2014). This perspective confirms reports from HM 
152 Treasury (2014) which stated that, apart from poor structuring of guarantee applications, many 
153 project sponsors were unable to demonstrate how their proposed PFI projects met set criteria. 
154 Wynne (2015) had also challenged the absence of transparency and competitive bidding 
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155 process in the guarantee scheme. Nevertheless, Treasury Department have maintained it 
156 conducts its assessment of guarantee applications using best practices (HM Treasury, 2013). 
157
158 According to HM Treasury (2014), as part of procedures for accessing the guarantee facility, 
159 the treasury department conducts due diligence appraisals for project proposals similar to 
160 commercial practice by project finance banks. Such appraisal involves risk assessments, 
161 economic and technical feasibility of PFI projects. The treasury also ensures that, each 
162 infrastructure project company is charged a non-refundable fee that is calculated based on 
163 market-oriented benchmark on current prices of risk margins. This fee, it considers as value for 
164 money to tax payers for accepting project risks. However, a number of criticisms have trailed 
165 the overall handling of the scheme and its impact on the entire UK PFI/PPP market (Carbonara 
166 et al., 2014; NAO, 2015; Wynne, 2015). Although the Treasury recorded her first guarantee in 
167 April 2013, by December 2014, only £1.7billion of the £40billion guarantee facility had been 
168 accessed (Wynne, 2015). With the facility due to terminate by December, 2019 (although with 
169 possible extension of the policy on the horizon); concerns have been raised as to the extent that 
170 such public sector guarantees justifies its primary objectives (Carbonara et al., 2014; NAO, 
171 2015; Gropp et al., 2014; Wynne, 2015). Therefore, in-depth understanding of critical factors 
172 needed by project sponsors to access the facility has been clamoured (Johal et al., 2012; 
173 Carbonara et al., 2014; Gropp et al., 2014; NAO, 2015).
174
175 3.0 Research Methodology
176
177 In order to deepen current understanding of critical factors for accessing the UK Guarantee 
178 Scheme for Infrastructures (UKGSI), the need to explore the perspectives of PFI/PPP 
179 stakeholders and confirm wider applicability of such views necessitated the adoption of a two-
180 way (explorative cum exploitative) methodological approach for the study. Described as 
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181 “multiple operationism” by Webb et al. (1966), mixed methodology allows the combination of 
182 methodologies in a single study. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2008), integrating 
183 quantitative and qualitative data in a study is considered essential to increasing richness and 
184 rigor in social inquiry. This buttressed Downward and Mearman (2007), who argued that, 
185 through triangulation, qualitative findings can be validated using quantitative analysis and vice 
186 versa. As such, by augmenting the non-overlapping weaknesses of either methods (qualitative 
187 and quantitative), with strengths of the other (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Creswell, 
188 2013); mixed methodology allowed research into the UKGSI to be robust. 
189
190 The exploratory approach to the study involves focus group discussions with stakeholders in 
191 UK PFI/PPP industry. The primary objective here was to facilitate authentic representation of 
192 correct views and interpretations that participants’ subjectively attribute to a phenomenon via 
193 their daily experiences (Alversson and Deetz, 2000). This is in contradiction to the imposition 
194 of a priori theory, where the researcher simply tests a set of pre-defined factors identified from 
195 literature using a deductive methodology (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). As such, the focus 
196 group discussions helped to bring together stakeholders in UK’s PFI industry to share their 
197 common understanding regarding the UK guarantee scheme; based on their previous 
198 involvement in PFI projects backed by government guarantee scheme. The focus groups 
199 comprised representatives of equity firms, senior lenders (banks), PFI/PPP contractors and 
200 public sector employees who have been involved in the UK guarantee scheme. By building on 
201 the views of one another through intersubjective interactions, participants were able to explore 
202 various perspectives on the scheme (Creswell, 2013). This provides deeper understanding into 
203 shared thinking on the topic of discussion (Chioncel et al., 2003). Thus, the major benefit here 
204 is that participants were able to remind one another of perceptions they may not have rec lled, 
205 an approach which is unlikely in the case of one-on-one interviews (Oyedele, 2013). 
206
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207 Considering the specialised nature of the UK guarantee scheme, identifying information-rich 
208 participants with experience of the scheme required the adoption of purposive sampling 
209 technique for the study. According to Blaikie (2000) and Neuman and Neuman (2006), 
210 purposive sampling is best fitted for cases where the researcher intends to conduct in-depth 
211 investigation about a unique type of study. This is more essential where the research 
212 participants may not be easily reached (Marshall, 1996; Cooper et al., 2006). This sampling 
213 approach therefore allowed the researcher to use wide network of contacts in the UK PFI 
214 industry, to access suitable stakeholders for the study. Examples of previous studies in project 
215 finance that had adopted this sampling approach are Bing et al. (2005), Li et al. (2005), Meng 
216 and McKevitt (2011) and Oyedele (2013). 
217
218 In order to explore participants’ common understanding of the phenomenon, four (4) focus 
219 group discussions were conducted in all. Eighteen participants were involved in the focus group 
220 discussions comprising, four (4) public sector employees, four (4) senior lenders (banks staffs), 
221 six (6) staff of equity investment firms and four (4) PFI/PPP contractors. In total, all the 
222 discussants have been involved in an average of 36 PFI/PPP project finance deals in their 
223 career. Additionally, the total numbers of UKGSI applications personally involved in by all 
224 participants were 16. The entire focus group discussions lasted 467mins. Table 1 shows further 
225 description of participants in the group:
226 Table 1: Overview of Participants involved in the Focus Group Discussions
FG Categories of Focus Group Participants Public 
Sector
employees
Senior 
Lenders
Equity 
Investors
PFI/PPP 
Contractors
Total
1. No.  of  Interview Participants 4 4 6 4 18
2. Average experience of participants in PFI/PPP 
Project financing
7years 9 years 8years 10years 34yrs
3. Duration of focus group discussions 75mins 112mins 160mins 120mins 467mins
Job Title of interview participants:
 Mid-level Staffs
0 0
2
0 24.
 Senior Staff 3 0 0 2 5
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 Manager 1 4 4 2 11
5. Average No.  of PFI/PPP projects involved 9 9 12 6 36
6. No. of UKGSI applications  involved 10 2 3 1 16
227
228 Discussions in each focus group explored experiences of various participants regarding 
229 PFI/PPP projects with emphasis on their involvement in UKGSI applications for projects. 
230 Issues such as how to ensure project bankability and criteria for ensuring successful guarantee 
231 applications were examined. Data collected from the focus group interviews were later 
232 transcribed and analysed using Nvivo10 software. From the qualitative data transcript, the 
233 author identified a comprehensive list of 26 important factors influencing the success of 
234 UKGSI guarantee applications for potential PFI/PPP infrastructure projects. 
235
236 The second phase of the study involved postal questionnaire survey developed using the criteria 
237 identified through focus group discussions. The adoption of questionnaire survey for this study 
238 centred on the need for wider applicability and reliability of findings generated from the 
239 qualitative study (Oyedele, 2013). Questionnaire respondents were identified via the UK PFI 
240 projects’ database provided by Partnership UK. From this database, a list of three hundred and 
241 five (305) financial and contracting firms, comprising senior lenders (banks), equity firms, 
242 financial consultants, hedge funds, pension fund managers, PFI/PPP contractors etc. were 
243 collated. The survey was piloted using three academics (in project management field), four 
244 lenders (staff) and two financial consultants, all of whom possess an average of 15.3 years’ 
245 experience in PFI/PPP deals in various capacities. Their feedback, which included rephrasing, 
246 and shortening of few questions were carried out, to develop the final questionnaire. In the final 
247 questionnaire, respondents were individually required to indicate the importance of criteria 
248 determining approval for PFI projects under the UK guarantee scheme for infrastructures. This 
249 was done on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 represented “Not Important” and 5, “Most 
250 Important”. 
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251
252 Distribution of the survey to various respondents was done via postal mail and accompanied 
253 by a letter of introduction to the study, as well as a return envelope each. Out of the two hundred 
254 and seventy one (271) questionnaires distributed, 195 questionnaires were returned amounting 
255 to a response rate 71.95%. Thirty-eight (38) of the questionnaires were incomplete and 
256 therefore rejected. This left us with a total of one hundred and fifty seven (157) usable 
257 responses from senior lenders (banks), equity firms, financial consultants and PFI/PPP 
258 contractors, representing 57.93% of distributed questionnaires. Data collected from the 
259 questionnaire survey was later analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
260 Software. Factor Analysis, which allowed the exploration and identification of the principal 
261 underlying dimensions behind the phenomenon, was conducted. This is in addition to 
262 identifying the importance of each criterion from the questionnaire using a Significant Index 
263 Rating. Table 2 shows the summary of sample response from the survey respondents. From 
264 Table 2, the response rate were, 86.5, 80, 86.4, and 57.3% comprising senior managers of 
265 banks, financial consultants, directors of equity firms, construction site managers respectively. 
266 This was considered suitable for analysis based on the claim by Oyedele (2013) that a survey 
267 result could be considered to be of little significance and biased if the rate of return was lower 
268 than 30 to 40%. All the respondents have been involved in an average of 21 UK Guarantee 
269 Applications for PFI/PPP projects. 
270
271 Table 2. Sample Responses from Questionnaire Survey
Professionals Number 
Distributed
Number of 
Responses
Percentage 
(%)Return
Av. years of 
Experience
Av. No. of PFI 
Projects 
Involved with
Senior Managers (Banks)
Hedge Funds Managers
Financial Consultants
Equity Investments Directors
PFI/PPP Contractors
67
25
40
59
61
58
11
32
51
35
86.5
44
80
86.4
57.3
21.5
12.0
15.5
17.0
15.0
20-25
20+
25+
25-30
20-25
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Pension Funds Managers 19 8 42.1 13.0 25+
Total 271 195 71.95 15.6 25+
272 4.0 Analyses of Data
273 This section discusses the qualitative and quantitative analyses of findings from focus group 
274 discussions with UK PFI industry stakeholders and responses from questionnaire survey as 
275 regards the UK guarantee scheme.
276
277 4.1 Qualitative Analysis and Findings
278
279 According to Creswell (2013), qualitative data analysis involves identifying significant 
280 statements, meaning units, structural and textual themes that highlight the essence of a 
281 phenomenon. This approach allows the researcher to transit from narrow units to broader units 
282 of analysis (Alversson and Deetz, 2000). After extensive discussions that spanned a total of 
283 467mins where participants explored various perspectives on the UKGSI, transcripts of the 
284 discussions were produced using Nvivo10 software. The author carefully read the data 
285 transcripts on several occasion, while identifying various themes from experiences of industry 
286 experts. After thorough analysis of the qualitative data, 26 important criteria that can influence 
287 approval for projects under the UK guarantee scheme were revealed (See Table.2 below). 
288 According to focus group discussants, these various factors, if carefully integrated in PFI/PPP 
289 project sponsors’ guarantee applications, will improve project bankability, and maximise 
290 chances of winning UKGSI approval for potential infrastructure projects.  
291
292
293 Table 3: Important Criteria Influencing Approval for UK Guarantee SchemeNo Focus GroupsCriteria for Accessing the UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures
1 2 3 4
1  Project is infrastructure in NIP-defined priority sectors.    
2  Compliance of project with European Commission guidance on state guarantees    
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3  Project must be nationally or economically significant in nature (Large scale).   
4  Project must be non-investment grade due to high construction risk    
5  Strong financial credibility of project.    
6  Project must be technically feasible.    
7  Existence of front-ended equity commitment from sponsors.   
8  Project must have robust risk structuring and management framework   
9  Competence of project consortium members  
10  Project must have obtained  approval and permit from authorities    
11  Project’s readiness to start construction within 52weeks of guarantee.    
12  Existence of delay in start-Up insurance by project consortium. 
13  Project’s compliance with other legal and regulatory laws.  
14  Project demonstrates how inadequate finance will hinder project.   
15  Project demonstrates the viability.  
16  Consortium proves lenders’ risk aversion and desire for more financial cover.   
17  Consortium proves how absence of guarantee will damage project time scales   
18  Clear identification of level of risk exposure in the project  
19  Projects must have acceptable credit quality.    
20  Compliance with social, legal and environmental laws and standards.   
21  Efficient risk transfer away from tax payers.   
22  Project’s affordability    
23  Project offers least Cost of procurement.    
24  Project offers opportunity for technological transfer   
25  Project offers innovative designs and strategies.   
26  Market-oriented fee commensurate to risk borne by the tax payers.    
294
295 The focus group discussions were also used to identify participants’ perspectives on issues such 
296 as:
297  Divergent stakeholders’ opinions regarding various guarantee criteria.
298 4.2 Quantitative Analysis and Findings
299
300 Reliability Analysis and Significance Ranking of Each Criterion
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301 Since one of the objectives of this study is to identify a reliable set of criteria used in evaluating 
302 UK government guarantee applications, reliability analysis was conducted. With the aid of 
303 Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), the Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficient for 
304 the 26 criteria was produced as 0.904. According to Field (2005), a high reliability coefficient 
305 usually above 0.7 confirms the greater internal consistency of the entire data to measure the 
306 construct it was aimed to measure statistically. Oyedele (2013) indicate that any factor not 
307 contributing to the internal consistency of the data will have a higher reliability score than the 
308 overall Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient (i.e. in this study, it is 0.904). Based on the 
309 results shown in the third column of Table 4, the 26 set of criteria show strong reliability in 
310 evaluating UK government guarantee applications for PFI/PPP infrastructure projects.
311
312 After the reliability analysis, this study was interested to know the significance ranking of each 
313 criterion. A significance index used by similar studies Tam et al. (2000) and Spillane et al. 
314 (2012) was used. This is mathematically expressed as:
315 (1)𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝑆𝐼) = (∑(𝑠)𝑁𝑆 ) × 100%
316 Where s represents the significance rating on a Likert scale of 1 to 5, S is the highest 
317 significance rating (that is 5) and N is the total number of responses for that particular factor. 
318 The significance index and ranking are shown in column four and five of Table 4 respectively. 
319 The top five most significant criteria for evaluating UK government guarantee scheme are (i) 
320 project must be nationally or economically significant in nature (ii) project must be 
321 infrastructure in NIP-defined priority sectors (iii) compliance of project with European 
322 Commission’s guidance on state guarantees (iv) strong financial credibility of project (v) 
323 project must be non-investment grade due to high construction risk. Likewise, the least five 
324 criteria for evaluating UK government guarantee scheme for infrastructures, as confirmed by 
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325 the respondents are: (i) project offers innovative design and strategies (ii) project offers 
326 opportunity for technological transfer (iii) existence of delay in start-up insurance by project 
327 consortium (iv) consortium proves lender’s risk aversion and desire for more financial cover 
328 (existence of front-ended equity commitment from sponsors.
329
330 Factor Analysis
331 After ascertaining the significance of each criterion, in line with the main objective of the study, 
332 which is to unravel the dominant structures underlying the various criteria, exploratory factor 
333 analysis was conducted. Factor analysis is a statistical technique used for data reduction or 
334 structure detection in which variability in observed or correlated items are identified from other 
335 smaller variables (Meredith, 1993). With factor analysis, a set of key uncorrelated factors are 
336 unravelled from the reduced data. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
337 adequacy value and Bartlett test of sphericity were 0.63 (higher than 0.5) and 8.1018e-34, less 
338 than 0.05 respectively. These two tests confirm that the data is appropriate for factor analysis. 
339 Principal Axis Factor and Varimax rotation were used for criteria extraction and rotation 
340 respectively. In order to assist in the interpretation of findings, all criteria with Eigen value of 
341 1 and above were extracted. In addition, all criteria with factor loading of 0.50 and above were 
342 picked for grouping the criteria (Tucker and Lewis, 1973). The analysis shows five factor-
343 solution with Eigen values greater than one (1) as shown in column three and five of Table 5. 
344 See also Fig. 3 for the associated Scree Plot revealing the graphical representation of the five 
345 critical factors. The five factor-solution account for 77.22% of total variance and were 
346 considered the critical factors influencing PFI project’s approval under the UK guarantee 
347 Scheme for Infrastructures. All the critical factors are labelled with due cognizance to the 
348 criteria that made them up. These are listed below
349 Critical Factor 1 : Project Compliance with UK National Infrastructure Plan
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350 Critical Factor 2:  Demonstration of Project Bankability and Risk Management 
351 Critical Factor 3:  Projects’ Demonstration of Value for Money to Tax Payers.
352 Critical Factor 4: Demonstrate Project’s Dependence on the UK Guarantee Scheme.
353 Critical Factor 5: Certainty of Planning Commission’s Approval.
354
355
356 Fig 3. Scree Plot Showing the Five-Critical Factors Extracted 
357
358 5.0 Discussion of Findings
359 This section discusses findings from the study by buttressing results from questionnaire survey 
360 with expert opinions from focus group discussions. The discussions are based on the five 
361 critical factors below:
362
363 Critical Factors for Winning the UKGSI Guarantee Approval 
364
365 Using the Eigen value as a measure of criteria grouping’s significance; evidences from survey 
366 responses produced five (5) critical factors for winning guarantee approval. Table 5 below 
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367 showed that three of the critical factors displayed higher Eigen value of 4.73, 3.95 and 2.67. 
368 This suggests higher importance rating of the critical factors from respondents; with respect to 
369 influencing UK guarantee scheme’s approval for projects. While the remaining two factors’ 
370 Eigen values are 2.57 and 1.22 respectively. Studies on PFI/PPP project financing such as Li 
371 et al. (2005); Zhang (2005); Ahadzi and Bowles (2004) have adopted similar statistical method.
372 CF1.  Project’s Compliance with National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) 
373 As shown in Table 5 below, project’s compliance with the NIP ranked highest in the survey 
374 analysis (see Table five: Eigen value of 4.73) and is identified as the most important parameter 
375 for winning guarantee approval under the UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructure (UKGSI). 
376 These perspectives confirm the views from focus group discussions as reflected by one of the 
377 participants who argued that:
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Table 4: Reliability Analysis & Significance Ranking of Factors Influencing Approval for UK Guarantee for PFI Infrastructures
No Factors Determining PFI project’s Approval for UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures Cronbach’s α 
if items 
deleted
Significance 
Index (%)
Criteria
Ranking
F.1 Project compliance with UK National Infrastructure Plan
F1a Criteria:
 Project is infrastructure in NIP-defined priority sectors.
0.900 95.20 2
F1b  Compliance of project with European Commission’s guidance on state guarantees 0.902 94.20 3
F1c  Project must be nationally or economically significant in nature (Large scale). 0.899 98.50 1
F1b  Project must be non-investment grade due to high construction risk. 0.897 87.40 6
F.2 Demonstration of project bankability and risk management
F2a Criteria:
 Strong financial credibility of project.
0.901 93.10 4
F2b  Project must be technically feasible. 0.900 85.10 7
F2c  Existence of front-ended equity commitment from sponsors. 0.879 41.10 26
F2d  Project must have robust risk structuring and management framework 0.902 81.80 9
F2e  Competence of project consortium members 0.893 55.90 21
F.3 Projects’ Demonstration of Value for Money to tax payers.
F3a Criteria:
 Projects must have acceptable credit quality
0.847 91.50 5
F3b  Compliance with social, legal and environmental laws and standards 0.890 69.90 16
F3c  Efficient risk transfer away from tax payers 0.904 79.80 11
F3d  Project’s affordability 0.902 83.70 8
F3e  Project offers least Cost of procurement 0.902 81.30 10
F3f  Project offers opportunity for technological transfer 0.878 49.50 23
F3g  Project offers innovative designs and strategies 0.898 51.70 22
F3h  Market-oriented fee commensurate to risk borne by the tax payers 0.895 74.70 12
F.4 Demonstrate project’s dependence on the UK Guarantee Scheme
F4a Criteria:
 Project demonstrates how inadequate finance will hinder project
0.903 61.50 19
F4b  Project demonstrates the viability 0.901 71.40 15
F4c  Consortium proves lenders’ risk aversion and desire for more financial cover 0.899 42.90 25
F4d  Consortium proves how absence of guarantee will damage project time scales 0.902 58.30 20
F4e  Clear identification of level of risk exposure in the project 0.896 67.10 17
F.5 Certainty of Planning Commission’s Approval 0.904
F5a Criteria:
 Project must have obtained  approval and permit from authorities
0.903 73.90 13
F5b  Project’s readiness to start construction within 52weeks of guarantee. 0.901 72.80 14
F5c  Existence of delay in start-Up insurance by project consortium. 0.898 44.30 24
F5d  Project’s compliance with other legal and regulatory laws. 0.901 63.20 18
Overall Cronbach’ Alpha =0.904, Significant at 95% Confidence interval =0.05
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Table 5: Factor Analysis for the Criteria Influencing Approval for UK Guarantee for 
    PFI Infrastructures
No Eigen 
Value
%
Variance
Factor 
Loading
F.1 Project compliance with UK National Infrastructure Plan 4.737 35.67
F1a
Criteria:
 Project is infrastructure in NIP-defined priority sectors. 0.843
F1b
 Compliance of project with European Commission’s guidance on state
guarantees 0.801
F1c  Project must be nationally or economically significant in nature (Large scale). 0.687
F1b  Project must be non-investment grade due to high construction risk. 0.585
F.2 Demonstration of project bankability and risk management 3.952 19.22
F2a
Criteria:
 Strong financial credibility of project. 0.739
F2b  Project must be technically feasible. 0.657
F2c  Existence of front-ended equity commitment from sponsors. 0.623
F2d  Project must have robust risk structuring and management framework 0.575
F2e  Competence of project consortium members 0.804
F.3 Projects’ Demonstration of Value for Money to tax payers. 2.674 11.14
F3a
Criteria:
 Projects must have acceptable credit quality 0.622
F3b  Compliance with social, legal and environmental laws and standards 0.540
F3c  Efficient risk transfer away from tax payers 0.773
F3d  Project’s affordability 0.638
F3e  Project offers least Cost of procurement 0.586
F3f  Project offers opportunity for technological transfer 0.517
F3g  Project offers innovative designs and strategies 0.864
F3h  Market-oriented fee commensurate to risk borne by the tax payers 0.858
F.4 Demonstrate project’s dependence on the UK Guarantee Scheme 2.578 7.05
F4a
Criteria:
 Project demonstrates how inadequate finance will hinder project 0.718
F4b  Project demonstrates the viability 0.621
F4c  Consortium proves lenders’ risk aversion and desire for more financial cover 0.583
F4d  Consortium proves how absence of guarantee will damage project time scales 0.869
F4e  Clear identification of level of risk exposure in the project 0.692
F.5 Certainty of Planning Commission’s Approval 1.229 4.14
F5a
Criteria:
 Project must have obtained  approval and permit from authorities 0.661
F5b  Project’s readiness to start construction within 52weeks of guarantee. 0.549
F5c  Existence of delay in start-Up insurance by project consortium. 0.611
F5d  Project’s compliance with other legal and regulatory laws. 0.537
Total 77.22
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“Projects of national significance with full compliance to the NIP and European 
commission’s guarantee guidance are majorly targeted under the guarantee 
scheme.” (Focus Group 3)
In line with the above assertion, the National Planning Commission described nationally 
significant projects as projects classified as large-scale developmental projects that meet a broad 
classification of infrastructure, ranging from transport, health, waste, energy, education, courts, 
prisons etc. As discovered during the course of the study, infrastructures in these priority sectors, 
and especially in transport and energy sectors, have been considered to be of priority. This 
confirms the UK government’s economic agenda to deliver sustainable and effective transport 
system for the UK in order to allow businesses and people to prosper, while reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions using more renewable/low carbon energy (Wynne, 2015). To this end, UKGSI 
allows the Treasury to guarantee large and innovative projects, which may be non-investment 
grade. Non-investment grade projects are high yield investment portfolio with relatively low 
credit quality and higher risk of default (Rigobon, 2002). Such projects are often rated below 
‘BBB’ from Standard and Poor’s rating agency and ‘Baa’ from Moody’s (Hite and Warga, 1997). 
From the Treasury’s perspectives, most large infrastructures are often non-investment grade 
(NAO, 2015), given their typically higher construction risks (Dailami and Klein, 1997). 
However, potential projects have to demonstrate potentials for improving credit quality over the 
course of time and a contribution to economic growth (Wynne, 2015). The criterion of project’s 
contribution to economic growth has however generated divided opinions among focus group 
discussants, with most private sector participants (Equity investment firms, senior lenders, 
contractors), describing the criterion as very ambiguous. A typical quote suggests that:
“One of the major criterion that sponsors may find difficult to address is to 
prove a project’s contribution to economic growth, considering the absence 
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of any objective testing criteria for such from the government. There are 
certain aspects that seem rather subjective”. (Focus Group 4) 
However, public sectors participants argue that, such criteria are left to the internal decisions of 
the Treasury but may be influenced by the novelty of such project and its wider impact on the 
UK as a whole. Additionally, findings also reveal that projects with higher than 5% default risk 
in any particular year stand little chance of being guaranteed, since that contravenes the European 
Commission’s guideline on guarantee scheme. The availability of relevant price benchmarks for 
non-investment grade risks in the project will better project assessment. 
CF.2 Demonstration of Project Bankability and Risk Management 
Project bankability and risk management ranked next in importance based on evidence from 
survey responses as shown in Table 5 with an Eigen value of 3.95. This result suggests that, 
given the high-risk nature of PFI/PPP projects, bankability remains the next crucial factor to 
consider (Yescombe, 2013). As such, a project is not considered bankable where risks related to 
its’ commercial viability have not been identified, allocated and mitigated within the project 
structure from a commercial perspective (Meng and McKevitt, 2011). These perspectives 
confirm opinions expressed by focus group discussants as summed-up by a senior lender who 
argued that:
“The crucial thing here is that the project must demonstrate bankability. In reality 
bankability is actually the starting point for any project financing, and the 
guarantee scheme prioritises this as well….” (Focus Group 1)
In line with the above assertion, HM Treasury (2013) highlighted that; projects must demonstrate 
bankability by satisfying minimum bankability requirements. Bankability in PFI/PPP projects 
requires that the commercial terms of a project be satisfactory to lenders. This emphasizes the 
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project’s ability to generate sufficient income that enables debt repayments to financiers and 
returns on investments to project sponsors (Meng and McKevitt, 2011). According to Delmon 
(2011), projects must show robustness in cash flow projections that is based on adequate Debt 
Service Cover Ratio (DSCR) over the project life cycle. Zhang (2005) argued that financial 
robustness in PFI projects is often hinged on successful project completion, which marks the end 
of construction stage. As such, assurances that such project will be successfully constructed 
within financial budget and stipulated time will require technical competence on the part of the 
project consortium (Akintoye et al., 1998). In that respect, competent construction contractor 
with wealth of experience in such projects, financial strength and tried-and-tested project 
technology will boast project bankability (Mills, 2010).  
Results also show that, since most PFI/PPP projects are often front-loaded in terms of capital 
involvement at the construction stage, sponsors may enhance bankability chances by agreeing to 
a front-ended equity injection. Front-ended equity stake in PFI projects (sponsors put in all their 
capital from project commencement), is seen as a huge demonstration of commitment from 
project sponsors towards the success of the project (Hoffman, 2008). Evidence also show that, 
where a guarantee application demonstrates strong understanding of project risks and capability 
to efficiently allocate and manage such risks in manner that unburdens the public sector, more 
bankability is conferred on such project. This buttressed Gropp et al. (2014), who argue that, the 
public sector is not involved in speculative businesses, and as such, any risk transfer to public 
sector under any guise must not be at the expense of the taxpayers. Therefore, competence on 
the part of the project consortium will ultimately inform the series of financial, technical and 
managerial decision that will ensure the bankability of projects (Mills, 2010), and a successful 
guarantee bid.
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CF3. Projects’ Demonstration of Value for Money to Tax Payers 
Value for money ranked third as a parameter influencing approval for UKGSI. This is evidenced 
by survey results in Table 5, with an Eigen value of 2.67. Value for money (VFM) to tax payers 
is considered a critical parameter for winning the UKGSI guarantee. In November 1994, the UK 
government mandated all public sector procurements to pass through value for money test 
(Akintoye et al., 2003). Here, the HM Treasury puts all procurements, using private sector 
finances, under three cardinal criteria namely: cost savings in comparison to cost of direct 
traditional procurements (using public sector comparator), affordability and efficient risk transfer 
away from the public sector (Cheung et al., 2009). Finding show that, asides charging market-
oriented fee to guaranteed project companies (which is considered the most important factor 
under the UKGSI VFM test, the value for money assessment also involves examining the 
viability of the project, social and environmental impact assessments, opportunities for 
innovative designs and strategies, etc.
However, the need for guarantee applications to fulfil value for money criteria generated various 
perspectives among focus group participants. While participants expressed collective views 
concerning the importance of VFM, they expressed different opinions on the number of VFM 
tests required for projects applicants under the scheme. Most private sector participants (senior 
lenders, equity investors and PFI/PPP contractors) in the focus group considered the scheme’s 
VFM test as cumbersome. As one discussant argued:
“Let’s not forget that in a PFI project, there is VFM test, during the bidding 
stage where the public sector clients expect a demonstration of VFM. Therefore 
having another VFM test at the guarantee stage simply is too much bureaucracy 
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to the current system…and obviously something has to be done to our regulatory 
regimes.” (Focus Group 2)
From public sector participants’ opinions, the current VFM test only examines whether the fee 
charged to project companies for obtaining government guarantee represents value to tax payers 
or not. This approach to VFM, according to many participants, is not holistic enough. As 
exemplified in the views of one participant:
“Value for money ensures the project does not present any fiscal or economic risk to 
the financial system. But quite frankly….the challenge here is that we can’t just simply 
look at the fees charged by the Treasury on guaranteed projects as representing VFM, 
while neglecting the aspect of whether the project itself represents VFM. So there is 
still need for bottom up approach on VFM in the scheme“. (Focus Group 3)
This perspective buttressed a recent study by Gropp et al. (2014) who argued that public sector 
guarantees have been argued to represent another on-balance sheet financing for governments, 
and as such, require proper management to the extent that it galvanises lending markets to their 
traditional roles. 
CF4. Demonstration of Project’s Dependence on the UK Guarantee Scheme
Dependence on UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructure is also another critical factor that 
influences guarantee approval under the UKGSI. Table 5 indicate an Eigen value of 2.57 from 
the survey results. As argued by NAO (2015), justifying the reliance of a proposed project on 
government guarantee is essential upon the objective that the UKGSI is not designed to grant 
direct infrastructure loans to project sponsors. As such, the facility must serve targeted audiences 
and prevent a situation where sponsors obtain guarantee for projects that could have been 
financed independently with no recourse to the scheme (HM Treasury, 2014). These arguments 
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also reflect perspectives from focus group discussions as aptly captured by one of the participants 
who argue that:  
“The scheme will only consider projects that prove how it cannot go ahead without 
the backing of UKGSI guarantee. There are several ways of proving that, but of 
course there is no point providing guarantee to projects who have no business been 
guaranteed” (Focus Group 1).
Wynne (2015) buttressed the above assertions by arguing that, it is essential to avoid investors’ 
undue exploitation of the public sector guarantee. This is because when providing guarantees, 
the public sector may incur significant contingent liabilities, such that if called upon to be paid, 
can be an enormous financial obligation (Wibowo and Kochendoerfer, 2010). Tiong (1995)  
argued that it is not logical for the public sector to allow project sponsors to simply make money 
while the risks in a project are passed down to the tax payers. To this end, guarantee applications 
must demonstrate how such PFI projects are not financeable from a commercial point of view. 
Findings show that sponsors may need to clearly articulate a detailed framework of barriers to 
such project investments in terms of identifying high-risk profile of such projects, which 
therefore makes such a non-investment grade investment, and thus require government guarantee 
support. Other strategies may include a demonstration of the benefits and significance of such 
PFI project to the economy that makes it laudable (e.g. low carbon emission projects, reducing 
travel time on transport links etc.). Evidences of the prior financiers’ verdicts on the projects 
weak prospects on a commercial level due to enormous technical and other risk risks may also 
confer some weight on the justification (Tiong, 1995; Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001). In 
addition, evidences of the credit quality rating of such project from credit rating agencies (e.g. 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) may give further impetus to the application concerning 
its weak credit rating (Wibowo and Kochendoerfer, 2010).
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CF5. Certainty of Planning Commission’s Approval 
Obtaining planning commission permit ranked least with respect to its’ influence on winning UK 
guarantee approval for PFI projects, based on results from survey analysis with an Eigen value 
of 1.22 (see Table Five). The need for planning permit was highlighted during the focus group 
discussions as one discussant argues that:
“The planning commission’s permit has been part of the system for years with respect 
to any development project in the UK. But the challenge here for sponsors has always 
been delays to obtaining planning permits and this has stalled many guarantee 
applications for important infrastructures” (Focus Group 4).
The need to obtain planning permit was highlighted by Mills (2010) and Wibowo and 
Kochendoerfer (2010), who argued that obtaining planning permits and approval for construction 
and operations of PFI projects is crucial to public sector guarantee for BOT projects. According 
to Mills (2010), such permit represents a major confirmation that the project sponsors are hoping 
to commence serious construction and operations of projects in earnest. Further evidences show 
that as part of procedures for considering guarantee applications, the UKGSI will consider 
whether the PFI project demonstrates evidences that it will commence construction of the project 
within 52weeks of guarantee approval. This particular factor may however be undermined by 
the lengthy procedures for obtaining planning permits (HM Treasury, 2014). According to 
National Planning Act (2008), decisions on applications for development consent orders (DCOs) 
are in strict accordance with National Policy Statements (NPSs). However, NPSs passes through 
series of procedures with respect to public consultations and parliamentary enquiry, before 
government’s formal approval. The entire cycle of obtaining planning commission’s permit from 
the pre-application stage through to acceptance, pre-examination, examination, decision and post 
decision stage may take not less than one year and four months. Further evidence also indicates 
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that, in a number of situations and for certain types of PFI infrastructures, sponsors may also be 
required to provide additional information with regards to compliance with the National Policy 
statements (NPSs). However, considering the amount of time invested in obtaining planning 
commission approval for PFI infrastructures (seeking to obtain UK guarantee), many 
applications have been aborted at this stage. Findings also show that many at times, project 
sponsors opt for a “Delay in Start-up Insurance”, in order to boost chances of winning 
government guarantee approval. The National Audit Office in her recent report of 2015 has 
bemoaned the lengthy process of obtaining planning permit for projects seeking government 
guarantee, arguing that, such prolonged process is capable of frustrating successful 
implementation of the UK guarantee scheme.
6.0 Conclusion
The intervention of the UK government through the UK Guarantee Scheme for Infrastructures 
(UKGSI) became necessary upon the aftermath of the last global financial crisis, which badly 
affected the PFI market and threatened private sector finances for UK public infrastructures. This 
study investigated the perspectives of stakeholders in UK PFI/PPP industry with respect 
obtaining guarantee approval under the UKGSI. Issues such as critical factors for winning 
guarantee approval and divergent stakeholders’ perspectives on guarantee criteria were explored. 
The study adopted a mixed methodological approach involving focus group discussions with PFI 
stakeholders (i.e. equity sponsors, lenders etc.) and postal questionnaire survey to ensure wider 
applicability of findings. After much explorative cum exploitative studies conducted, findings 
from the study revealed 26 important criteria influencing successful guarantee application. The 
significance index and raking of the criteria revealed five topmost criteria which includes: (i) 
project must be nationally or economically significant in nature (ii) project must be infrastructure 
in NIP-defined priority sectors (iii) compliance of project with European Commission’s guidance 
on state guarantees (iv) strong financial credibility of project (v) project must be non-investment 
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grade due to high construction risk. With the aid of factor analysis, a five factor-solution 
representing critical factors underlying the various criteria for winning the UK government 
guarantee approval were unravelled. These critical factors include; (i) project alignment with UK 
NIP policy in terms qualifying as infrastructure and falling within priority sectors (i.e. roads, rail, 
aviation, renewable energy etc.) (ii) Demonstration of project bankability and risk management 
(i.e. credit quality) (iii) Project’s demonstration of value for money (VFM) (iv) demonstration 
of project’s dependence on the guarantee scheme (v) certainty of obtaining planning 
commission’s permits for projects. The study shows that, the five factor-solutions, if diligently 
incorporated in guarantee applications will enhance approval rate. Further evidences from the 
study also suggest differences of opinions among PFI industry stakeholders with respect to the 
appropriateness of a number of the criteria (i.e. value for money and project’s contribution to 
economic growth). These diverse opinions put the private sector participants (i.e. equity 
sponsors, senior lenders and PFI/PPP contractors) and public sector employees on separate 
divide on issues. The study showed that the absence of objective testing indicators for certain 
guarantee criteria (VFM, measuring economic growth impact of project) have hindered project 
sponsors’ understanding of how best to access the UK government guarantee scheme. The 
rigorous nature of the VFM assessment of the scheme has also been questioned with the public 
sector calling for project-level to guarantee-level VFM assessment. In this regard, policy makers 
must therefore address the divergent stakeholders’ opinions, in order to create a win-win strategic 
framework with a bottom-up approach. Additionally, a robust engagement with industry 
stakeholders to foster clearer understanding of the guarantee scheme, transparent and objective 
evaluation of infrastructure project guarantee applications are also crucial for the public sector 
to consider. The national impact assessment of the scheme should therefore extend towards 
examining the total contribution of UKGSI to the entire segments of UK project finance and 
infrastructure industry as a whole.
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The outcome of this study has been limited to the criteria for accessing the UK Guarantee Scheme 
for Infrastructures, particularly with respect to PFI/PPP project financing. Currently, little is 
known regarding how the scheme evaluates the economic growth impact of a PFI/PPP project 
under the scheme. Further empirical research might also be required to examine the impact of 
the UKGSI on green field and brown field infrastructure investments in the UK. This study will 
no doubt be useful to policy makers, project sponsors, financiers and other industry stakeholders 
concerning reorganising the scheme as well as exploiting maximum benefits from such 
government policies in the near future.
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